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ABSTRACT
In 1966, the Department of Defense under the direction of Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara implemented a program called Project 100,000.  Project 100,000 
aimed to induct 100,000 men per year into the military, men previously unqualified for 
mental and physical reasons.  A “War on Poverty” program, and part of President Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society, the goals of Project 100,000 were to give men jobs, provide 
skills training, and to inculcate a sense of obligation to country.  From 1966 to 1972, 
nearly 400,000 “New Standards Men” were drafted into the military under Project 
100,000.
While Project 100,000 is often discussed under the rubrics of race and class, this 
thesis argues that gender is the key variable to understanding the program.  Project 
100,000 must be understood within the context of a post-World War II culture dominated 
by warrior manhood and the belief that the military produced strong men.  To 
policymakers, Project 100,000 was about salvaging, rehabilitating, and saving men from 
a future of poverty and marginalization. While the program failed to deliver widespread 
training in military occupations that could translate into the necessary skills to compete in 
the civilian workforce, this thesis finds evidence that tempers past assessments of Project 
100,000 as a complete failure.  Although the idealism that led the Johnson Administration 
to create Project 100,000 was overtaken by the exigent circumstances of the Vietnam 









At the 1967 convention of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters, 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara declared, “I want to talk to you this morning 
about the unused potential of the Department of Defense -- a potential for contributing to 
the solution of the social problems wracking our nation.” How, McNamara asked, can its
“vast resources be used to contribute to our nation’s benefit beyond the narrow -- though 
vitally necessary -- role of military power?” Mired in an ever-escalating war in Southeast 
Asia, McNamara suggested that the Defense Department open a new front in President 
Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty.  Project 100,000, dubbed “McNamara’s Moron 
Corps” by its critics, aimed to induct 100,000 men per year into the armed services who 
were mentally unqualified (draft category IV) for military service due to poor 
performance on aptitude tests.  McNamara’s vision for these “New Standards Men” 
matched the loftiest goals of the broader Great Society.  He told the convention, “Project 
100,000 [will] salvage the poverty-scarred youth of our society at the rate of 100,000 men 
each year—first for two years of military service, and then for a lifetime of productive 
activity in civilian society.” He believed that if America did not rescue these men from a 
future of futility, “they, their wives and their children would almost inevitably be the 
unproductive recipients of some form of the dole 10 years from now.”1
                                                        
1 Robert McNamara, "Remarks by Secretary McNamara to the National Association of Educational Broadcasters" 
(Denver, Colorado, November 7, 1967).
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The New Standards Men of Project 100,000 generally were recruited from 
America’s poor. Nearly a third earned less than $60 a week.  Most were poorly educated, 
barely able to read at a sixth-grade level.2
These young men… can be rehabilitated, both inwardly and out.  They are men, 
we concluded, who… placed in an atmosphere of high motivation and morale, 
could be transformed into competent military personnel…. Many are poorly 
motivated when they reach us.  They lack initiative.  They lack pride.  They lack 
ambition.
More than likely, they had not completed high 
school (53 percent), were from the South (47.6 percent), were disproportionately black 
(38.2 percent), and collectively, averaged in the thirteenth percentile on the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). With the military’s “experience in educational 
innovation and on-the-job training,” McNamara believed that these men could break the 
cycle of poverty.  In McNamara’s view, 
3
The Selective Service inducted 49,000 of these men in 1966, and 100,000 annually after 
that.  In all, nearly 400,000 men who failed to meet the minimum requirements of the 
armed services prior to 1966 either received induction notices or enlisted under Project 
100,000.4
Critics point out that the Defense Department implemented Project 100,000 
shortly after Lyndon Johnson dramatically escalated America’s involvement in Vietnam.   
                                                        
2 According to a September 1968 Department of Defense document, the percentage of those earning less than $60 a 
week dropped to 18 percent.  Still, 38 percent of New Standards Men were unemployed at the time of their induction. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Project One 
Hundred Thousand: Characteristics and Performance of "New Standards" Men, (U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare), v.  Over 40 percent of New Standards Men could barely read at a sixth-grade level.  Lawrence 
M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, The War, and The Vietnam Generation (New 
York: Knopf, 1978), 129.  Baskir and Strauss wrote Chance and Circumstance based upon their experiences with 
President Gerald Ford’s Clemency Boards that reviewed for pardon draft offenders from the Vietnam War.  Part of 
their reasoning for supporting clemency stemmed from the number of Project 100,000 men who deserted or went 
absent without leave (AWOL) during the war.  
3 McNamara, “Remarks.” 
4 Janice H. Laurence and Peter F. Ramsberger, Low-Aptitude Men in the Military: Who Profits, Who Pays? (New 
York: Praeger, 1991), 15-61.  See also: Thomas G. Sticht, William B. Armstrong, Daniel T. Hickey and John S.
Caylor, Cast-off Youth: Policy and Training Methods From the Military Experience (New York: Praeger, 1987); G. 
David Curry, Sunshine Patriots: Punishment and the Vietnam Offender (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1985); Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance.
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Fresh souls strapped into combat boots bound for Southeast Asia was the order of the 
day.  However, the Selective Service System already churned out sufficient numbers of 
draftees to meet manpower requirements without having to tinker with enlistment 
standards.  Why did military service become the means to salvage, rehabilitate, and save
these men from themselves? Why did the Defense Department become an instrument of 
social welfare? To understand the nature of Project 100,000, it must be placed in the 
context of a post-World War II culture shaped by concepts of masculinity and war. How
did officials construct manhood? What importance did they place on military service in 
building male citizenship? What experiences did they share that shaped their 
understanding of masculinity?  If Project 100,000 was about making men out of those 
who they felt lacked the initiative, pride, and motivation to become men by themselves, 
what did war and military service mean to its creators?   
Writing in 1993, Vietnam historian Christian Appy remarked that despite its 
prominent role in the Great Society, “Project 100,000 has virtually disappeared from the 
histories of the Johnson presidency.”5
                                                        
5 Christian Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 
1993), 32.
When New Standards Men are discussed in the 
historiography, it is under the rubrics of class and race.  In his book, Working-Class War,
Appy argues that Project 100,000 was one of several institutional mechanisms that 
significantly lowered the class composition of the military.  The Selective Service 
system’s medical exemptions and student deferments that favored the more affluent, and 
the existence of safe-havens in the National Guard and Reserves created a working-class 
military.  Lowering admissions standards through programs like Project 100,000 further 
shielded middle and upper class men from the draft. Lawrence Baskir and William 
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Strauss, in their influential monograph on the draft, Chance and Circumstance, argue that 
class politics motivated the Johnson Administration to create Project 100,000.  They 
contend that Project 100,000, by expanding the working class manpower pool, limited 
dissension by reducing pressure on the middle class.  The administration also shielded 
itself from criticism by portraying the program as an antipoverty measure designed to lift 
the disadvantaged out of the ghettos and into the military.6
Issues of race interact with, and often exacerbate, conditions of class.  Baskir and 
Strauss note that black men were prime targets of Project 100,000.  Despite protests from 
civil rights leaders, Baskir and Strauss stress that administration officials believed 
military service would fast track equality for black men. In Pawns: The Plight of the 
Citizen-Soldier, Peter Barnes shows that once standards were lowered, military recruiters 
targeted black men in urban ghettoes. In one year in the San Francisco Bay area, Marine 
Corps recruiters enlisted five residents from white Piedmont and Berkeley, and 120 from
black Oakland. The military sent African American recruiters to “rap with the brothers” 
about the benefits of military service and told young black men that the military was a 
colorblind place.7
Beyond race and class, scholars have begun to look at the history of the Cold War 
and Vietnam through a gendered lens. Gender is the wide set of fluid characteristics that 
                                                        
6 Appy, Working-Class War, 37; Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 122-123.  See also G. David Curry, 
Sunshine Patriots.  Curry challenges the image of the stereotypical Vietnam “draft dodger,” arguing that most were 
poor, uneducated, and came from broken families rather than “pampered,” unpatriotic, middle class boys from the 
suburbs.  To Curry, Project 100,000 exposed socially maladapted men to hazardous military duty to shield more 
politically vocal middle class men from service in an unpopular war.
7 Floyd B. McKissick, director of the Congress of Racial Equality, said in 1966 that Project 100,000 was “a cynical 
method to punish black youths for the social ills imposed on them by the major [sic] society.”  Quoted in "Rights 
Leaders Deplore Plan to 'Salvage' Military Rejects," New York Times (August 26, 1966), 3; Baskir and Strauss, Chance 
and Circumstance, 125-127; Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1984), 560-61; Peter Barnes, Pawns: The Plight of the Citizen-Soldier
(New York: Knopf, 1972), 44.  See also Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1991), 319-20.
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define social roles for men and women.  While the categories male and female are 
biologically determined, masculinity and femininity are defined, negotiated, and 
constrained by time, place, and culture. According to historian Joan Scott, gender is 
useful because, “[it] is a primary way of signifying relationships of power… politics 
constructs gender and gender constructs politics.”8 Historian Robert Dean writes that, 
“ideals of ‘manhood’ or ‘womanhood’ held by a society are circulated through the culture 
and, to a large extent, are individually internalized in the form of narratives.”9
Continuously and constantly, an individual’s gender identity is recognized and 
reinterpreted in relation to others in society. Events in men’s lives that coincide with 
hegemonic narratives, or those with the most currency, are retold more frequently.
Lyndon Johnson’s World War II service exemplifies this process.  Although Johnson 
only participated in one brief combat mission during the war, he constructed a robust
warrior identity.  Depending upon the crowd and the context, Johnson changed, 
rearranged, and exaggerated the details of this story. John F. Kennedy, too, retold his 
heroic tale in different ways depending upon the audience and the circumstance.  Often, a 
nation’s leaders are held up as role models, their experiences framing ideals of true 
manhood.  In families, schools, and by popular culture outlets, masculinities are defined, 
shaped, and interpreted.10
                                                        
8 Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," American Historical Review 91, no. 5 
(December 1986), 1069-70. 
9 Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2001), 5-6. 
10 For gendered interpretations of the Cold War, see: Susan Clark, Cold Warriors: Manliness on Trial in the Rhetoric 
of the West (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000); K.A. Cuordileone, Manhood and American 
Political Culture in the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2005); Dean, Imperial Brotherhood; Susan Faludi, Stiffed: 
The Betrayal of the American Man (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1999); Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: 
American Families in the Cold War Era, Revised (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
 6 
Foreign policy decision makers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were
subject to similar influences as lifelong participants in “manhood framing” institutions
such as boarding schools, Ivy League fraternities, men’s clubs, and of course, the 
military. Dean writes, “Imperial traditions of ‘service’ and ‘sacrifice’ are invented and 
bequeathed to those” who participate in these institutions.11 Men absorbed these 
narratives and gained access to elite institutions of power: Congress, the Departments of 
State and Defense, policy think tanks, top-tier academic establishments, and the White 
House.  Seldom did a man possess all the requisite experiences (although Kennedy stands 
out as one, having attended elite boarding schools, Harvard, and heroic participation in 
World War II).  Yet each involved in the creation of Project 100,000 was shaped by
military experiences. Grounded in society’s expectations of masculinity, they gained 
prestige and a sharpened gender perspective from their military service.  Gender, then, is 
critical to understanding not only identity, but also authority and citizenship.  Gender 
offers an essential framework to consider the masculinities most admired in American 
culture and the means used by those in power to shape a new generation. 
                                                        
11 Dean, Imperial Brotherhood, 4.
FRAMING MANHOOD
The postwar world denied Americans the fruits of their victory.  In the 1950s, the 
threat of a competing superpower and the danger of nuclear annihilation brought 
uncertainty and fear.  Enemies were within, as well, and loyalty, once so clear, was now 
confused.  Transition from war to peace raised questions of individualism and manhood 
in both domestic and public life.  Books about contemporary society, such as Sloan 
Wilson’s The Man In The Gray Flannel Suit (1955; made into a movie starring Gregory 
Peck in 1956) or William H. Whyte’s bestselling The Organization Man address these 
central issues.  Traditional male roles like head of household and breadwinner became
unstable:  how can a man establish a name for himself amidst a corporate bureaucracy 
that rewards “yes men” and punishes independence?  In The Organization Man, Whyte 
argues that there can be no manly fulfillment within a structure that reinforces conformity 
and subservience.  In the film The Man In The Gray Flannel Suit, a man’s home, his 
sanctuary, crumbles at its foundation.  The protagonist, Tom Rath, comes home each day 
to find that his children refuse to obey him and his wife barely respects him.  Although 
Rath’s World War II experiences haunt him, he still reflects on them fondly, yearning for 
a return to a more secure manhood.
In response, in searching for greater certainty and old verities, a warrior tradition 
became pronounced.  It was apparent in the rebirth of popular westerns where lone men 
went on a quest to save civilization and themselves.  It was particularly visible and even 
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more palpable in the cult of World War II. America’s memory of the war epitomized 
military strength, security, and solidarity.  During the 1950s and early 1960s, the warrior 
tradition, as a requisite for leadership as well as an idealized cultural principle, was 
ubiquitous. Dwight Eisenhower was the first general elected president in the twentieth 
century. World War II service played a prominent role in the political campaigns of 
Joseph McCarthy, Richard Nixon, John Kennedy, Barry Goldwater, and Lyndon 
Johnson.  Whether in politics or business, veterans wore their service as an emblem not 
only of patriotism but also their masculinity.
At a time when the authority of other traditional masculinities waned, popular 
novels and films refortified the military service narrative.  Searching for emulative
concepts of masculinity in novels about World War II, such as The Naked And The Dead
(Norman Mailer, 1948) and The Thin Red Line (James Jones, 1962), may seem difficult,
steeped as they are in themes of regret, cruelty, and futility. Near the beginning of The 
Thin Red Line, a group of soldiers gleefully conduct a treasure hunt to a shallow mass 
grave of decaying Japanese soldiers, pulling gold teeth from bodies and robbing the dead 
of their worldly possessions.  Compassion and innocence are the first casualties of war.  
Young Lieutenant Hearn in The Naked And The Dead spends his days pondering the 
morality of warfare and the cynical motives of soldiering.  His interlocutor, General 
Cummings, rewards his conscientiousness by transferring him to a combat unit where he 
is abruptly killed in an ambush, senselessly betrayed by the callous, war-hardened 
Sergeant Croft. The men in these novels become barbaric, ruthless, and wanton killers—
such is war. But these novels also conveyed powerful lessons in American manhood. A
reviewer of The Naked And The Dead wrote in 1948, “The generation that grew to 
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manhood on the eve of the last war was not ideally suited to saving the world for 
democracy. Its minorities--two of the characters are Jewish, one a Mexican-American--
had not yet been assimilated fully into the national dream.”12
These lessons are apparent when looking at World War II films.  Film scholar 
Jeanine Basinger argues that it was essential for World War II combat movies to portray
a group of men, comprised of mixed backgrounds, who come together to complete the
mission.  Films such as A Walk in the Sun (1946), Sands of Iwo Jima (1949), 
Battleground (1949), and The Longest Day (1962) are representative. Led by a tough, 
no-nonsense leader, of which John Wayne (Sands of Iwo Jima, The Longest Day) is the 
archetype, a familial bond of brotherhood is created. Characters like Sergeant Stryker or 
Lt. Colonel Vandervoort stand in as father figures. On the screen, men bicker over small 
things, even get into fights, but when the shooting starts they all unite. Those who 
survive combat are changed men.  At the end of Sands of Iwo Jima, after Stryker is killed, 
the men read an unfinished letter to his son.  Stryker’s men feel like he is writing to them,
conferring on his military sons the nobility of masculinity. Their pledge to finish the 
To save their nation, they 
had to change.  They killed for a cause that none could doubt.  In coming together from 
many races, religions, and regions, they proved their mettle and the truth of the melting 
pot.  These Americans, these new men, had triumphed.  In spite of the authors’ best 
intentions to question men’s actions in fighting, they also reinforce the belief that men 
persevered. War is hell, but it is a hell survived. In novels about World War II, such as
The Young Lions (Irwin Shaw, 1948), From Here To Eternity (James Jones, 1951), and 
Battle Cry (Leon Uris, 1953), America is reaffirmed by the sacrifice of its young men.
                                                        
12 David Dempsey, “The Dusty Answer of Modern War,” New York Times (May 9, 1948), 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/04/reviews/mailer-dead.html (accessed August 29, 2010).
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letter is a promise to return home after the war and make it a better place. For the 
American audience, Basinger contends, what is important is the ritual of watching war 
together.  Through this shared experience, Americans made sense of the war and 
celebrated its satisfactory conclusion and their survival.  “The war was now war movies,”
so crucial to understanding the construction of warrior masculinities.13
Building on this understanding of Cold War masculinity, it is essential to consider 
the gendered arguments, military experiences, and identities of the men who created 
Project 100,000.  The centrality of the military service narrative in the personal stories of 
men such as Kennedy, Johnson, McNamara, and members of the defense establishment 
framed the ideological foundation for Project 100,000.  The personal became political in 
the language they used to defend the project from critics and in extolling the virtues of 
military service.  Analyzing their words within the context of the decision-makers
personal narratives will help establish a gendered interpretation of Project 100,000 and a 
better understanding of America, masculinity, and the Vietnam War.
John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson came from remarkably different backgrounds. 
One was the son of a destitute farmer from Texas, the other was born to a wealthy 
businessman and ambassador.  Johnson attended a backwater community college; poor 
boys could afford little else. Kennedy attended Eastern prep schools and graduated from
Harvard.  Johnson spent half of his life running from the Hill Country of Texas. Kennedy
was a Boston Brahmin, bred to carry the family standard. Johnson’s father, Samuel Ealy, 
was a member of the Texas House of Representatives, sent to Austin by impoverished 
farmers on a populist platform.  Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr. held a number of positions in the 
                                                        
13 Jeanine Basinger, The World War II Combat Film: Anatomy of a Genre (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), 156.
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Roosevelt Administration, most notably Ambassador to Great Britain.  Johnson’s 
political pedigree was born of frustration from generations of men eking out a living in
subsistence farming and cattle ranching. Kennedy’s career was rooted in his father’s 
ambitions and fortune.14
The attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 occurred at different points in the 
two men’s lives.  Johnson, nearly a decade Kennedy’s senior, had already established 
himself as head of the Texas National Youth Administration (NYA) under the New Deal,
as a staffer to Congressman Richard Kleberg, and finally, through election to the United 
States House of Representatives in 1937.  According to historian Robert A. Caro, 
Johnson’s ambition for high office began at an early age; he told teachers and 
schoolmates, “Someday, I’m going to be President.”15
                                                        
14 Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path To Power, Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); 
Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent, Vol. 2 (New York: Vintage Books, 1991); Robert 
Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy. 1917-1963 (New York: Back Bay Books, 2003); Thomas C. Reeves, A 
Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy (Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 1997); Edward J. Renehan, The 
Kennedys At War: 1937-1945 (New York: Doubleday, 2002).
War service was a necessary 
ingredient to ambition. In Congress, where Johnson rarely took a firm stand on bills 
under debate, he was a vociferous ally of President Roosevelt in passing the Selective 
Service Act in 1941.  At the time, isolationist sentiments were still strong in American 
political discourse.  The popular opinions of Father Charles Coughlin and America 
“Firsters” like Charles Lindberg resonated with many members of Congress, and the Act 
passed by a razor-thin majority, 203-202.  Johnson, despite growing up in a house where 
the writings of socialist Eugene Debs were gospel, began to believe that peace could only 
be achieved through war.  Rejecting the policies of “the old men of yesterday,” Johnson 
15 Caro, Path To Power, 100.
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declared, “Every one of us is a soldier in the heat of Democracy’s battle against the Nazi 
world.”16
While politics weighed heavily on Johnson’s decision to join the military, 
Kennedy’s reasons were more complicated.  Most Kennedy biographers agree that his 
decision hinged on several factors, manhood and duty to country chief among them.  
Declared Kennedy, “I am rapidly reaching a point where every one of my peers will be in 
uniform… and I do not intend to be the only one among them wearing coward’s 
tweeds.”17 Kennedy also felt that he spent much of his youth in the shadow of his older
brother, Joseph Kennedy, Jr.  Finally, most of young Jack’s decisions revolved around his 
complex relationship with his father.  Joe Kennedy, Sr. held military service in disdain, 
calling it a “suckers’ game,” and during World War I he gave up several lucrative 
banking positions to run a shipyard at a fraction of his annual income to avoid the draft.  
While at Harvard, the two sons mirrored their father’s isolationist views in their writing 
and political activism. Torn between his father’s antipathy for war and his growing 
concern that he might miss out on his generation’s defining moment, Jack Kennedy had a 
difficult choice to make in 1941.  The decision to join the military became Kennedy’s 
opportunity to prove himself.18
Johnson and Kennedy spent the first half of 1942 wearing the military uniform of 
a country at war, albeit far from any real danger. While Kennedy worked at Naval 
Intelligence in Washington D.C., Johnson inspected naval bases in California, or in “the 
                                                        
16 “President Calls For ‘Naked Force,’” New York Times (August 22, 1941).
17 Quoted in Renehan, The Kennedys At War, 191.
18 Dallek, An Unfinished Life, 61-68, 81-82; Reeves, A Question of Character, 48-55; Renehan, The Kennedys At War,
123-125, 191-192.
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Pacific” according to friendly newspapers in his congressional district.19 Kennedy, 
meanwhile, maintained an active social life befitting a young bachelor in uniform. Both 
men worked in the usual wartime positions doled out to well-connected men.  Yet, after 
several months of serving stateside, Kennedy and Johnson used these connections to be 
assigned overseas. Certainly Johnson, who possessed an undeniable knack for 
politicking, saw the benefits of combat. After all, he was fighting for reelection.  His 
aides filed his congressional candidacy papers on the same day that Johnson shipped off
to the Pacific.  According to historian Doris Kearns, who interviewed Johnson years later 
about World War II, his foray into the Pacific “would make a decisive impression.  For 
him, as for most others of his generation, it would be the event that resonated in their 
minds whenever they thought about international affairs: the decisive lesson.”20
Lieutenant Commander Johnson received orders for Australia on April 29, 1942.  
At Johnson’s request, President Roosevelt tasked him to report on the war effort, which at 
the time (prior to the Battle of Midway) was going badly. Two Lieutenant Colonels, 
Samuel E. Anderson and Francis R. Stevens, accompanied Johnson to Australia.  Johnson 
was shocked at how disorganized the military effort was in Australia, remarking in his 
diary that U.S. and Australian servicemen were “all fighting each other” and that 
“indecision, delay, and procrastination” were real problems.21 Once in Melbourne, 
General Douglas MacArthur unenthusiastically briefed the trio and remarked wryly to 
Johnson in particular, “God only knows what you’re doing here.”22
                                                        
19 Caro, Means of Ascent, 23-26.
From there Johnson 
toured military facilities in Melbourne, Sidney, and Brisbane, keeping brief notes in his 
20 Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 95.
21 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Diary” (81 pages of handwritten notes in a small notebook written during his time in the 
Pacific), LBJ Library. 
22 Quoted in Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 237.
 14 
diary about troop levels and equipment conditions, while jotting down observations on
the morale of the men he encountered.  Despite its brevity, the diary gives an impression 
that the men Johnson met truly inspired him. Little notes such as, “Poor mail service.  
Good Food—lots of guts [referring to the men]” or “One of the best, General Aiken” are 
scattered throughout.23
Not satisfied with merely inspecting airfields, Johnson insisted that MacArthur 
allow him to participate in a bombing run to “see personally for the President just what 
conditions were like.”
He seemed genuinely impressed with how the men maintained 
their spirits despite occasional mail, poor quality food, and difficult living conditions. 
24 Observing officers were generally barred from participating in 
bombing missions, given the lack of space on the flights and the likelihood that the planes
would encounter real danger.  Least likely to be permitted to go would be high profile 
men like Johnson.  Yet, he persisted and convinced MacArthur to let him fly. Before 
boarding a B-26, the Heckling Hare, a crewmember gave him a final warning: “You’re 
out of your goddam mind.  This ain’t no milk run, believe me!  You don’t need to come 
along and get shot up to find out about conditions here, or the things we need: we’ll tell
you that.”25
Shortly into the bombing run, Japanese Zeros attacked the B-26s in Johnson’s 
formation.  The right engine of the Heckling Hare stalled and quit, causing the plane to 
dive. Pilot Walter Greer began evasive maneuvers to shake the three Zeros that fired on
the wounded bomber. Amidst the fire and confusion Johnson, “cool as a cucumber,” 
according to one crewmember, stood on a stool so he could see out of a plexi-glass dome 
Johnson, undeterred, took his place in a spare jump seat.
                                                        
23 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Diary.”
24 Quoted in Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 238.
25 Quoted in Caro, Means of Ascent, 40-41.
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in the ceiling of the plane.  Not satisfied with watching, Johnson assisted in spotting 
targets for the gunners. Smiling throughout, he gestured with three fingers to one of the 
gunners, saying calmly, “There’s three out there to the left.”  With a bad engine and
taking numerous shots to the fuselage, the Heckling Hare had to jettison its payload and 
limp back to base without dropping its bombs.  After the Zeros broke off their attack, 
Johnson laughed and said to the radioman, “Boy, it’s rough up here, isn’t it?”26
Johnson’s ambition might have resulted in his death, but his decision to go on that 
mission gives us insight into his character and the type of man he envisioned himself to 
be. He saw himself as a courageous man of action. He insisted on flying and once he 
was in the firefight he refused to be an observer. In that brief moment when he calmly 
pointed out targets for the gunner, Johnson felt like he was a warrior in the heat of 
“Democracy’s battle.”  Far from the safety and the routine of his Congressional office, 
surrounded by bullets, chaos, and roaring engines, Lieutenant Commander Johnson felt 
alive.  One could easily write off his campaign statements about being “in the trenches” 
as political grandstanding, but politics or not, Johnson took serious risks to carry out 
those promises.  Blind ambition may have made Johnson a warrior, if only for a moment, 
but he was aspiring to a masculine ideal he had only dreamed of before.      
Several officers, who were anxious to see if the Congressman had made it back, 
met the crew on the runway.  Johnson’s only remark: “It’s been very interesting.”27
                                                        
26 Quoted in Caro, Means of Ascent, 41-43.
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of the eleven bombers returned from that mission.  Lt. Colonel Stevens, one of Johnson’s 
comrades from Washington, died along with the crew of the Wabash Cannonball.
Johnson reflected briefly in his diary on the courage he witnessed, “Boys unshaven, 
27 Ibid.
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breath smells, they haven’t bathed but Crockett, Bowie, Bonham, and Travis had nothing 
on them but guts [sic],” and also the tragic loss of his friend, “Couldn’t get my mind off 
Steve… and other fine boys.”28
General McArthur, who was more than a little relieved that the Congressman had 
returned unscathed, summoned Johnson to his headquarters.  When MacArthur asked 
why Johnson had been so reckless, Johnson responded, according to a witness, “many of 
the airmen knew that he was a Congressman from Texas—that many were his 
constituents—and that he wanted to show them he would face the same dangers they had 
to face.”29 MacArthur awarded Johnson and Lt. Colonel Anderson Silver Stars for 
heroism.  Lt. Colonel Stevens was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and the 
Purple Heart, posthumously.  Johnson was the only person aboard the Heckling Hare to 
receive a medal. Silver Star in hand, he was shortly on a plane bound for the States and 
back in Congress—and out of uniform—by midsummer 1942. He wore the Silver Star 
pin on the lapel of his suit jacket for the rest of his life.30
By this time, Ensign Kennedy had grown tired of fighting the war behind a desk.  
Despite his quiet routine, Kennedy checked into Chelsea Naval Hospital in early summer 
1942 suffering from back pain. While convalescing for nearly two months, Kennedy first 
heard about PT boats.  The PTs were heavily romanticized in the press despite being 
utterly ineffective in combat. From his hospital bed, Jack listened to radio broadcasts 
recounting the daring deeds of PT skippers. Kennedy was drawn to the idea of 
commanding his own vessel. On his decision to forsake the safety of Washington D.C. 
                                                        
28 Johnson, “Diary.”
29 Quoted in Caro, Means of Ascent, 44.
30 Caro, Means of Ascent; Dallek, Lone Star Rising.  Dallek argues that Johnson’s Silver Star may have been political 
back scratching on the part of General MacArthur.  MacArthur saw the Congressman as a political ally in Washington, 
one who could champion his position to the President and in the press, 240-41.
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and request active service with the fleet, his life-long friend and fellow veteran Lem 
Billings offered this poignant explanation, 
He was always so behind the eight-ball with his health, that he would engage in 
this bravado—right? —to overcompensate and prove he was fit when he really 
wasn’t.  So, he turns into a killer football player and he turns into a voracious 
womanizer, a stud.  Then what’s next?  Well, of course, he turns into a voracious 
warrior, hungry for a fight.  It was the logical next step given the times.  Nothing 
surprising.  I always thought it was kind of interesting that Jack read Hemingway 
an awful lot, with all those flawed heroes coming on strong: striving, enduring, 
spoiling for fights and for opportunities to prove themselves.  That was Jack.31
Kennedy received appointment to the Naval Reserve Midshipman’s School at 
Northwestern University on July 27, 1942 along with 1,023 other candidates, a “cross-
section of American manhood” according to one reporter, simply “a good bunch” in 
Kennedy’s eyes.32
Now a Lieutenant, junior grade, Kennedy reported to the Motor Torpedo Boat 
Squadron Training Center in Rhode Island.  It was here that he realized the inglorious 
truth about PT boats, a dose of reality conspicuously missing from the romantic accounts 
circulating in the press.  The PTs were about eighty feet in length, wooden-hulled, and 
powered by three gasoline engines totaling about 4,500 horsepower with a top speed of 
about forty knots.  Woefully under-armored and lacking effective weaponry (usually a 
combination of .50 caliber machine guns, 40mm cannons, depth charges, and torpedo 
tubes that fired antiquated torpedoes), the number of Japanese ships or aircraft destroyed 
in combat was zero when Kennedy entered school. Due to a lack of live munitions for 
training, most PT crewmen never fired a torpedo until they reached combat. 
                                                        
31 Quoted in Renehan, The Kennedys At War, 220.
32 Renehan, The Kennedys At War, 221.
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Lieutenant Kennedy took command of PT-109 and her crew on April 25, 1943.  
Nightly patrols in the waters near Tulagi Island followed.  For the most part, these patrols 
were uneventful and served as a respite from the constant blackouts and frequent air raids 
on Tulagi.  Now Kennedy realized the disconnect between the war and how it was 
reported in the press back home. The news stories, filed by reporters “seldom out here,” 
angered Kennedy.  “People get so used to talking about billions of dollars and millions of 
soldiers that thousands of dead sounds like drops in the bucket.”33 Kennedy despised the 
absentee leadership of high-ranking admirals and generals, warning his father, “Don’t let 
any one sell the idea that everyone out here is hustling with the old American energy.  
They may be ready to give their blood but not their sweat, if they can help it, and usually 
they fix it so they can help it.”34
Kennedy’s disconnectedness from the home front, coupled with his disdain for 
ineffective military bureaucrats, tightened his ties to those around him.  The isolation of 
war, the routine of nightly patrols, and the inability to relate to those in higher positions 
of command were the building blocks of camaraderie. It was this close bond with his 
men that Kennedy cherished most. As a son of the elite, he should have felt comfortable 
with the rigid customs and courtesies that surround generals and admirals.  Yet, he was 
far more at ease in his rat and cockroach infested PT boat, eating food that unsettled his 
troubled stomach, and rubbing elbows with his mostly blue-collar crew.  Although his 
wealth and social standing were well known in the squadron, it was never important
according to accounts of those with whom Kennedy served.  His men, who knew about 
                                                        
33 Letter, John F. Kennedy to parents, undated (received September 12, 1943), “Correspondence 1943-Family” folder, 
Personal Papers 1917-1963, box 5, John F. Kennedy Library.
34 Letter, John F. Kennedy to parents, May 14, 1945, “Correspondence 1943-Family” folder, Personal Papers 1917-
1963, box 5, John F. Kennedy Library.
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his poor health, protected Kennedy from scrutiny.  Thus, his first commanding officer 
once said, “As far as I can remember, his health was good.  If there had been any serious 
problems I would certainly have relieved him of command of the 109.”35
In late spring 1943, Squadron Two was ordered to the Russell Islands, near the 
Japanese stronghold of New Georgia.  The New Georgia campaign had turned into a two-
month-long bloodbath for the Marines fighting the heavily entrenched Japanese.  Nightly 
convoys of Japanese destroyers, frigates, and troopships ran supplies and reinforcements 
through Ferguson Passage and Blackett Strait—or “the Slot”—bound for the islands of 
New Georgia, Kolombangara, and Vella Lavella.  Called “the Tokyo Express” by 
Admiral Halsey, the PTs were tasked with interdicting Japanese movement. Within a
week, Kennedy’s crew on the 109, along with those from the 105, 106, and 161 sustained 
casualties.  Despite the constant attacks and austere living conditions, morale was high on
His men, 
however, would remember their skipper sleeping most nights on a wooden plank because 
of his bad back and eating gallons of ice cream for his troubled stomach.  Brotherhood 
also kept Kennedy from trouble on a number of occasions. After one routine patrol,
Kennedy and another PT skipper played chicken on their way back to base.  Kennedy 
flinched late and rammed his boat into the dock damaging the 109. His close relationship 
with his commanding officer saved him from a court martial and his men fondly dubbed 
him “Crash” Kennedy after the incident. Removed from the empty rhetoric in the press 
and innocent conversations at home about valiant men marching silently and heroically 
into battle, Kennedy learned the truth about war: survival is all that matters.  More 
importantly, the bond with his men was the key to survival.  
                                                        
35 Quoted in Reeves, A Question of Character, 61-62. 
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the 109.  He wrote his parents, “What is interesting though is that some of the mildest 
most unassuming fellows—stand up & do the best job—and another pleasant surprise—
the tougher it gets—the less beefing you hear.”36
On the night of August 1, 1943, the 109 sat idling in “the Slot,” waiting to
ambush Japanese vessels returning from resupplying troops on a nearby island. Against 
squadron policy, Kennedy had the gears to only one of his three engines engaged, thus 
making his boat less maneuverable.  When the destroyer Amagiri struck, it split the 109 
in half.  The impact threw Kennedy forward into the cabin, where he landed on his back.  
According to the official report, scarcely ten seconds elapsed between sighting and 
impact.  Two crewmen died in the crash and the boat’s engineer was badly burned.  
Kennedy and five others clung to a piece of the hull left floating in the water.  Kennedy 
and two crewmen found the five other survivors and brought them to the relative safety 
of the floating hull.  Getting his bearings, Kennedy directed his men to swim to a deserted 
island.  Swimming on his stomach, he towed his burned shipmate by clenching the straps 
of his life jacket in his teeth.  This ordeal took five hours of hard swimming.
Stranded on a deserted island, Kennedy’s men soon exhausted the supply of 
coconuts from the few trees growing there.  After a failed attempt to swim out into the 
strait and flag down a passing PT boat, Kennedy and his men swam to Olasana Island a
half mile away on August 4.  His crew safe, Kennedy and another crewman swam to a 
nearby island in hope of finding help, when natives in canoes spotted them.  They waved 
their arms and yelled, but the natives paddled away without stopping.   Although 
Kennedy did not know it, the natives worked for the Allies and reported to a coast 
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watcher. The natives returned to meet Kennedy, who carved his famous message in a 
coconut for them to deliver: NARU ISL NATIVE KNOWS POSIT HE CAN PILOT 11 
ALIVE NEED SMALL BOAT KENNEDY.  Kennedy’s squadron launched a rescue and 
all survivors of the crash were saved.
Kennedy’s emotions were mixed.  He was angry that his fellow PT skippers left 
him and his men for dead.  He was embarrassed at losing his boat.  Most of all, he was 
bitter about the deaths of two of his men.  Shortly after the rescue, he wrote to his 
parents, “It was a terrible thing… losing those two men.”  He told his parents that one of 
them “had a feeling that something was going to happen to him.  I don’t know whether 
it’s just coincidence or what.  He had a wife and three kids.”  The other “was only a kid 
himself.”37 However, the resentment he had in the first few months of combat was gone.
He wrote his father, “I had become somewhat cynical about the American as a fighting 
man.  I had seen too much bellyaching and laying off.  But with the chips down—that all 
faded away.”38
His own modesty aside, Kennedy’s heroism made national headlines.  A front-
page article in the New York Times, “Kennedy’s Son Is Hero in Pacific As Destroyer 
Splits His PT Boat,” made reference to Kennedy’s desperate swim out into “the Slot” and 
his coconut message.39
                                                        
37 Letter, John F. Kennedy to parents, received September 12, 1943.
The Navy, perhaps needing a human-interest story, cleared 
Lieutenant Kennedy of any wrongdoing or negligence and awarded him the Navy and 
Marine Corps Medal for saving his men’s lives.  An article, “Kennedy Cited as Hero by 
38 Ibid.
39 “Kennedy’s Son Is Hero in Pacific As Destoyer Splits his PT Boat,” New York Times (August 20, 1943), 1.
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the Navy For Saving Men of PT Crew in Solomons,”40
World War II was significant for Kennedy personally, not simply for his political 
future as critics were quick to point out. Like most men who participated in the war, he
returned to the world changed. He was different physically—significant weight loss and 
jaundiced skin— and his health continued to worsen.  His poor health became visual 
evidence of his personal sacrifice.  Importantly, Jack had also undergone a psychological
transformation.  During those first few months in the Pacific, he expressed cynicism 
toward ideals of American manhood and felt concerned that the United States lacked the 
resolve to win.  He saw ineptitude, “bellyaching,” and laziness.  Yet shortly after his 
rescue, he wrote to his father, “I can now believe— which I never would have before—
the stories of Bataan and Wake.”  He had seen resolve, sacrifice, courage, and had felt the 
close bond of men.
reprinted the medal citation in 
full.  Despite the headlines, whenever Kennedy spoke he put the spotlight on his men and 
talked of their courage.  He never thought his actions were extraordinary.  Regardless, the 
story of the son of an ambassador saving the lives of his fellow sailors struck a chord 
with the American people.  This is what they expected of their fighting men.
41
Jack Kennedy came from war knowing that the military could transform men, and
while combat sobered Kennedy, it revitalized Johnson. Perhaps lacking the modesty of 
Kennedy and certainly possessing a knack for storytelling, Johnson never missed an 
opportunity to retell his experiences, show footage of himself in uniform to friends at a 
dinner party, or remind people of his war service. Johnson boastfully exaggerated until
                                                        
40 “Lieut. Kennedy Cited as Hero by the Navy For Saving Men of PT Crew in Solomons,” New York Times (June 12, 
1944), 7.
41 Letter, John F. Kennedy to parents, received September 12, 1943.  For criticism of Kennedy, see Reeves, A 
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his version of the story did not resemble the truth.  The routine bombing run became a 
“suicide mission.” A shot-down Zero became fourteen kills: Johnson even gave a 
nickname to his warrior persona, telling people “the boys” called him “Raider.”
Johnson’s embellishment of his war record reveals how he wrapped himself in a warrior 
image, one that was seamlessly woven into the tapestry of the man and the politician.
Kennedy also surrounded himself for the rest of his life with reminders of his war 
service.  The tale of the PT-109 became a critical narrative in his political career.  His 
former crewmembers appeared at campaign rallies, staff members issued literature 
touting their candidate’s naval service, and a life-sized PT-109 float featured prominently 
in Kennedy’s inaugural parade. By constructing narratives and enveloping themselves 
with visual reminders of their warrior pasts, Kennedy and Johnson conformed to 
dominant American cultural mores about masculinity.  In doing so, they gained prestige, 
influence, and power. Yet, they were more than passive figures. They role modeled a 
warrior masculinity and were prepared to act on it.  
Once in office, both presidents invited men who had served in World War II to 
their administrations. Kennedy and Johnson knew these men possessed the right stuff to 
carry out their ambitious agendas.  Kennedy believed that the willingness to sacrifice, a 
characteristic he witnessed during the war, stood above all other qualities:  “Where 
else…but in the political profession is the individual expected to sacrifice all—including 
his own career—for the national good?  [In] public life we expect individuals to sacrifice 
their private interests to permit the national good to progress.”42
                                                        
42 John F. Kennedy, Profiles In Courage (New York: Perennial Classics, 2004), 7.
Reflecting in the 
aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, Johnson wrote in his memoir, “My perceptions 
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of America persuaded me that three separate conditions were required before social 
change could take root and flourish in our national life—a recognition of need, a 
willingness to act, and someone to lead the effort.”43 In the minds of Kennedy and 
Johnson, military men possessed the qualities necessary to transform the nation.  The 
majority of their cabinet secretaries were prior military. Robert McNamara, who wrote 
that his time in the military “had a great impact on my life,” worked as a systems analyst 
for the Army during the war.44 His service in the Army led McNamara, still in his 
uniform, to an interview at Ford Motor Company where he later became president. In 
1961, he became Secretary of Defense. Daniel P. Moynihan, an architect of the War on 
Poverty, joined the Navy during the war.  His work in the Department of Labor 
contributed to what would later become Project 100,000. Undersecretary of Defense for 
Manpower Alfred Fitt, whose job was to oversee Project 100,000, served in the Army.
World War II veterans filled the ranks of government, but had particular cachet in 
defense-related posts. The warrior tradition—built upon personal sacrifice, courage, 
leadership, and the bond of camaraderie—was well represented among the best and the 
brightest.  
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SALVAGING MANHOOD
The tradition of warrior manhood is vital to understanding how Kennedy, 
Johnson, and the men in their administrations interpreted the rights and obligations of
male citizenship. Moreover, the power that the warrior tradition held over postwar 
Americans fueled the belief that the place for making better men was within the structure 
of the military.  This was not new to the 1960s. The military as a site for building strong 
and productive men has deep roots in the American experience. The military’s role in 
social welfare can be traced back at least to the Great Depression. Under the New Deal, 
the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was created to put idle young men to work.  
Because it possessed the manpower and logistical capabilities, the War Department 
outfitted, trained, and led what one historian called “Roosevelt’s Forest Army.”45
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CCC recruit, after passing a physical, went through a modified “boot camp” to be 
conditioned for hard labor.  They were issued military uniforms and gear. Reserve 
officers and noncommissioned officers from the Army ran the CCC camps, maintained
discipline, and ensured that the men worked diligently. To President Roosevelt, the goal 
of the CCC was explicitly about salvaging men.  He wrote to Congress in 1933, “More 
important, however, than the material gains will be the moral and spiritual value of such 
work…. We can eliminate to some extent at least the threat that enforced idleness brings 
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to spiritual and moral stability….”46
The American people widely accepted the view that military service was an 
essential obligation of (male) citizenship.  Patriotism meant “answering the call” when 
the nation was threatened.  Doves in Congress prior to World War II, when the Selective 
Service Act passed by a mere vote, quickly transformed into hawks after Pearl Harbor.  
We know that the Kennedys were staunch critics of intervention, yet all of the sons 
donned the uniform of their country.  Patriotic service was the standard during the 1960s,
and politicians called upon their fellow Americans to fulfill their obligations as citizens in 
new and creative ways.  Said Kennedy, “Ask not what your country can do for you.  Ask 
what you can do for your country.” The Peace Corps, Job Corps, and VISTA were 
shining examples of citizen engagement in a decade marred by assassinations, violence, 
and war.  However, to policy makers and their constituents at the time, military service 
was an integral part of the New Frontier and the Great Society.   
Given the right tools, motivation, and a military 
environment, Roosevelt believed that men’s self-worth could be salvaged. Of course, 
social welfare programs from the New Deal to the Great Society were designed to 
ameliorate conditions of poverty, stem job loss, and later to confront racism. In those 
goals, gender’s role is implicit: to give a man a job is to give him back his livelihood, his 
manhood.
Much like the government’s experience with the CCC during the Great 
Depression, the military became the obvious choice for saving America’s poor.  On 
September 30, 1963 President John F. Kennedy wrote, “I am deeply concerned about the 
fact that half of the young men who have been reporting for pre-induction examinations 
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under the Selective Service System are being found unqualified for military service.”47
Kennedy established a task force to investigate why so many men were rejected and to 
create solutions. The president’s rationale was rooted in his New Frontier agenda to 
eradicate poverty in America.  He wrote, “Today’s military rejects include tomorrow’s 
hard-core unemployed.”48
In January 1964, the taskforce published “One-Third of a Nation: A Report on 
Young Men Found Unqualified for Military Service,” the title a homage to the words of 
Franklin Roosevelt a generation earlier: “one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-
nourished.”  According to the authors, “[We have] a unique opportunity to identify those 
young men in our Nation who are—for reasons of education, or health, or both—not 
equipped to play their part in society.”49
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men onto the right track.  They wrote, “Far too many of these young men have missed 
out on the American miracle,” of the military.50
A little more than a month after he convened his taskforce, Kennedy was killed.    
Somber newsmen held up images of a gaunt and pale Lyndon Johnson taking the oath of 
office aboard Air Force One, flanked by Jacqueline Kennedy and Lady Bird Johnson.
According to McNamara, the next six months were tumultuous, filled with “uncertainty, 
confusion, and error.”51
I eventually developed my own programs and polices, but I never lost sight of the 
fact that I was the trustee and custodian of the Kennedy administration.  Although 
it was my prerogative to do so, I would no more have considered changing the 
name of the Honey Fitz—the name Jack Kennedy had given one of the 
Presidential yachts— than I would have thought of changing the name of the 
Washington Monument.  I did everything I could to enhance the memory of John 
Kennedy….
At the same time, members of the new administration rallied to 
the memory of the fallen president. There is an insightful passage in Lyndon Johnson’s 
memoir, The Vantage Point, which captures his sentiments and governing philosophy in 
the wake of Kennedy’s death:
52
Johnson seized the promises of Kennedy’s New Frontier to eradicate poverty and 
combat racism.  On January 8, 1964, in his first State of the Union address, Johnson 
announced his War on Poverty. The bellicose title for his initiative was no accident: he
meant to rally the people to the cause of eliminating poverty.  Again, rehabilitating 
manhood was central to the goal of economic prosperity.  Johnson said in his speech that
“One thousand dollars invested in salvaging an unemployable youth today can return 
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forty thousand dollars in his lifetime.”53 Several months later, during the ’64 campaign 
against Senator Barry Goldwater, Johnson laid the foundation for the Great Society.  
Johnson believed that the Great Society was an extension of the Bill of Rights.  Its twin 
pillars, eradicating poverty and fighting racism, became the focus of every cabinet 
official.  Johnson feared “that as long as these citizens were alienated from the rights of 
the American system, they would continue to consider themselves outside the obligations
of that system.”54
Nowhere was the disparity between rights and obligations more acute, believed 
Johnson, than among the African American community.  The administration feared that 
the burgeoning movement for civil rights could explode into violence and even rebellion 
if black people continued to feel like they did not have a stake in the system.  
Furthermore, policy makers did not believe that jobs and welfare programs alone would 
fix the “Negro problem.”  Guaranteeing the right to vote, also, would only go so far to 
incorporate African Americans into the mainstream of American society.  In March 1965, 
the Department of Labor’s Office of Policy Planning and Research, under the direction of 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, published “The Negro Family: The Case For National Action.”  
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz sent an abridged version to the President, noting that,
“The attached memorandum is nine pages of dynamite about the Negro situation.”  The 
president, impressed with the article that became known as “The Moynihan Report,” 
included its findings in a major civil rights speech at Howard University.55
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In the report, Moynihan argued that addressing the “Negro problem” required a 
radical rethinking of poverty policies and strategies. Hundreds of years of slavery and 
the persistence of racism and segregation had made equality unattainable for most black 
Americans.  Worse, Moynihan felt that for African Americans, centuries of mistreatment
fundamentally changed the structure of the black family. “The white family has achieved 
a high degree of stability [in the twentieth century] and is maintaining that stability.  By 
contrast, the family structure of lower class Negroes is highly unstable.”56 Black 
marriages too often ended in divorce and children were raised without the father present.
The rapidly increasing percentage of babies born out of wedlock was unprecedented.
Women were the heads-of-household, and to Moynihan, matriarchy meant 
marginalization for black men.  “A matriarchal structure… seriously retards the progress 
of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on the Negro male….”57 Having 
lost their place as husbands and fathers, black men were less likely to do well in school 
and were more likely to drop out of high school than black women.  Only 4.5 percent of 
black men went to college, compared to 7.3 percent of women.  While the ratio of black 
males to females in the workforce was four to one, women were more likely to have a 
skilled job than men.  Moynihan thought it was “extraordinary” that black people had 
survived at all, stating, “a lesser people might simply have died out, as indeed others 
have.”58
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principle” while the majority followed another.59
The failure of black masculinity translated into hunger, poverty, violence, crime, 
and drug use. To rehabilitate black men, Moynihan suggested that the government heed 
the advice of “One-Third of a Nation.”  He believed, “The ultimate mark of inadequate 
preparation for life is the failure rate on the Armed Forces mental test,” which stood at 56
percent for African Americans.  Moynihan saw a direct relationship between the rights 
and obligations of citizenship, as did Johnson.  He argued that the present system 
excluded black men from military service, the notional duty of male citizens.
Furthermore, Moynihan saw the military as a colorblind space where black men would be 
treated as the equals of their white comrades.  Most important to Moynihan, the military 
would provide black men a refuge from domineering black women:
But the problem was more than 
economics.  There was a crisis in black manhood that threatened not only the current 
generation, but also all those to follow.
There is another special quality about military service for Negro men: it is an
utterly masculine world.  Given the strains of the disorganized and matrifocal 
family life in which so many Negro youth come of age, the Armed Forces are a 
dramatic and desperately needed change: a world away from women, a world run 
by strong men of unquestioned authority….
A masculine world would rehabilitate black manhood. “Strong men of unquestioned 
authority” would replace female role models.  “In the U.S. Army,” so the contemporary 
slogan went, “you get to know what it means to feel like a man.”60
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environment.  After their service, economically and psychologically stable black fathers 
would lift their families from poverty. The military would build men to be the fathers of 
a generation able to find the American dream.
These were not empty words to the men of the Johnson administration. They 
appear too frequently to be dismissed as rhetoric. To these policy makers, a man who 
could not pass the minimum requirements for military service lacked something essential.  
He was “unqualified,” “ill equipped,” and “unstable,” and thus, “alienated” from society.
Manhood, especially of the warrior type, was critical to Johnson’s men. Like their efforts 
to rebuild crumbling urban slums, masculinity could be restored and refortified. In his 
memoir, Lyndon Johnson tells a story about an antipoverty project in Philadelphia that 
converted a dilapidated jail into a community center for training unemployed men.  He 
quotes the project’s leader, Reverend Leon Sullivan, “[The jail building] is the most 
dank, most dismal place in town, a symbol of tragedy.  If I could transform that building, 
I could transform men.”61 Salvaging manhood through military service was central to 
Johnson’s mission.  Here was the means to impart a sense of duty to country, so essential 
to citizenship. Further steeling Johnson’s resolve was his landslide victory in the 1964 
election over Barry Goldwater.  Johnson believed that the ’64 election was a referendum 
on the Great Society.  In Johnson’s words, the election equaled a “mandate for unity… a 
mandate for action, and I meant to use it that way.”62
Following the recommendations of “One-Third of a Nation,” Robert McNamara 
introduced the Special Training Enlistment Program (STEP) in 1964.  This program 
targeted potential enlistees scoring between fifteen and thirty on the Armed Forces 
                                                        
61 Quoted in Johnson, The Vantage Point, 86.
62 Ibid., 110.
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Qualification Test (AFQT), which required a minimum score of thirty-one for enlistment.  
The goals of the program were to enlist 15,000 men annually and send them to Fort 
Leonard Wood for intensive educational training prior to their completion of boot camp.  
The Defense Department estimated that the additional cost per trainee would be $2,100.63
McNamara reintroduced STEP to Congress in 1965.  Critics argued that job 
programs already existed and there was no need. Some, such as South Carolina Senator 
Strom Thurmond, believed that STEP would drain the Army’s training resources.  On the 
Senate floor, he asked Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson, “Does not the Senator feel
that these young men should be trained in the educational fundamentals by the Job Corps 
rather than to place this responsibility upon the Army, which has its hands full training 
soldiers?” Nelson responded, “We provide education in our schools, which education
[sic] helps young men enter the Army…. The Army is the biggest single educator in 
America…. This is a function the Army could handle very well.”64
According to Undersecretary of Defense Alfred Fitt, McNamara was furious.  Fitt 
recalled that, “[He] was quite put out at having met this defeat… of a project that seemed 
to have a very high potential for good without any real degradation in military 
readiness.”
While the House 
voted to allow the Defense Department to proceed with STEP, the Senate balked at the 
price and the program died.
65
                                                        
63 Laurence and Ramsberger, Low-Aptitude Men in the Military, 16.
Believing that congressional rejection was merely about dollars and cents,
McNamara devised a program that did not require additional funding.  This new program 
would lower the induction standards to allow rejected men in, send them straight to boot 
64 Congressional Record, 89th Cong. 2nd sess. (August 25, 1965), Senate 21719-20. 
65 Transcript, Alfred B. Fitt Oral History Interview by Dorothy Pierce, Interview 1 (October 25, 1968), LBJ Library.
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camp, and merely monitor their progress.  In essence, McNamara envisioned a STEP-like 
program without the need for separate or additional training facilities. Worried that 
Congress would see this as a ruse to initiate STEP through the back door, Fitt advised 
McNamara to wait until year’s end to make any announcements.  McNamara refused, and 
in fact, had already issued orders to lower the requirements on the AFQT in April 1966, 
something he deemed the Defense Department could do without congressional approval.
He told his undersecretary to write a speech outlining the project, which McNamara gave 
before a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in the summer of 1966, immediately 
after Congress came back from recess. Project 100,000 was officially born October 1966
without further response from either the House or Senate.66
Despite its artful inception, the Johnson administration soon publicized Project 
100,000 in earnest. With Project 100,000, the goals of eradicating poverty and ending 
racism were merged with national service. The president brought this message to 
Congress on March 6, 1967 in a speech on the Selective Service System.  He reminded 
Congress of the sacrifices that freedom required: “The knowledge that military service 
must sometimes be borne by—and imposed on—free men so their freedom may be 
preserved is woven deeply into the fabric of the American experience.”  Project 100,000 
would allow, “disadvantaged youths with limited educational backgrounds” to share in 
the benefits and burdens of service.  His words echoed his many speeches on the
importance of the Great Society: “The nation can never again afford to deny to men… the 
obligation—and the right— to share in a basic responsibility of citizenship.”67
                                                        
66 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance; Laurence and Ramsberger, Low-Aptitude Men in the Military; Fitt 
Interview, 11-12.
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67 Quoted in, “Text of President Johnson’s Message to Congress on the Selective Service System,” New York Times
(March 7, 1967), 32.
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100,000 was part of Johnson’s dream of universal national service.  Like such Great 
Society programs as VISTA or Kennedy’s Peace Corps, opening the doors of the military 
to a broader spectrum of society was a means toward mobilizing the country in pursuit of 
the “national interest.” In Johnson’s words, “two great streams in our national life 
converged—the dream of a Great Society at home and the inescapable demands of our 
obligations halfway around the world.  They were to run in confluence until the end of 
my administration.”68 According to Fitt, “It was put together in a way which made it 
very difficult to criticize from the outside,” including “elements [that] are readily 
understandable and acceptable.”69
Roughly 40,000 New Standards Men were inducted in 1966, and 100,000 in both
1967 and 1968.  Critics of STEP, who argued that New Standards Men would drain
Army resources, were silenced when 96 percent completed boot camp, which was only 2
percent less than other recruits. Feeling somewhat vindicated after Congress’s rebuke,
McNamara proclaimed, “The plain fact is that our Project 100,000 is succeeding beyond 
even our most hopeful expectations.”70
The Army is the last chance for many of them, if they are rejected from the Army, 
they have nothing left…. They roam the streets.  They get in a group, something 
develops, and the next thing you know they are in the courts.  On the other hand, 
those who have served, maybe in Vietnam, are very proud of their service.  Many 
want to go back and serve in Vietnam for their nation.
As Fitt said, the program was “very difficult to 
criticize.” Meanwhile, congressional rhetoric often blended the practical with reasons of 
character. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in May 1967, Senator 
Edward Kennedy quoted a Project 100,000 trainer:
71
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69 Fitt Interview, 11-12. 
70 McNamara, “Remarks.” 
71 Congressional Record, 90th Cong, 1st sess. (May 4, 1967), Senate 11854-55.
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Senator Kennedy argued for the continuation of Project 100,000, noting, “preliminary 
results” were “highly satisfactory… particularly from the standpoint of the military,
because of the high military motivation of this group.”72 When Kennedy testified, no 
data on the performance of Project 100,000 recruits existed, and none was ever collected 
on the “motivation” or morale of New Standards Men while they were in the service.  To 
solicit the opinions of New Standards Men would have violated McNamara’s policy to 
protect Project 100,000 men from unjust scrutiny and ridicule: New Standards Men were 
not to know that they were part of “McNamara’s Moron Corps.”73
Like Ted Kennedy, defenders of Project 100,000 could not help but speak of the 
program in terms of masculinity. Men in the administration and supporters in Congress 
used strikingly similar language to describe the benefits of Project 100,000. Ideals of 
manhood that held currency within society were circulated and repeated. In a speech to 
Congress in January 1968, President Johnson came prepared to talk about the statistical 
success of Project 100,000.  He told Congress that 96 percent of New Standards Men had 
graduated basic training.  Some had proudly joined the ranks of noncommissioned 
officers in the service.  Based upon the first year’s success, Johnson declared that he had
authorized McNamara to continue Project 100,000 in 1968. However, Johnson quickly 
turned to metrics of success that were less concrete, declaring, “All have gained self-
When Kennedy spoke 
about “high military motivation,” he championed the commonly held belief that the 
military produced motivated men.
                                                        
72 Ibid.
73 McNamara believed that protecting the identity of New Standards Men was the key to Project 100,000’s success.  
However, many in each recruit’s chain of command had access to personnel files, which made deducing who was a 
New Standards Man relatively easy. Also, in the early stages of Project 100,000, New Standards Men were assigned a 
service number beginning with “67.”  Although the DoD quickly fixed this problem, New Standards Men were referred 
to derisively as “sixes and sevens,” which ironically is an old English idiom, meaning a state of confusion and disarray.  
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confidence and a sense of achievement” from their service in the military. “It is the man 
who must be the focus of our concern and attention.”74 After the President’s speech to 
Congress, Speaker of the House John McCormack observed, “Like the glorious sun 
breaking through dark clouds on a stormy day, the President’s message lights up a clear 
and welcome path ahead.”  Speaker McCormack believed that Project 100,000 would 
“[remove] the cancer of doubt and hopelessness that has been gnawing at the Nation’s 
vitals.”75 When McNamara spoke to the Educational Broadcasters Association, he 
proclaimed, “The Defense Department is the world’s largest producer of skilled men.  
[There are] 1,500 different skills, in more than 2,000 separate courses.  And each year we 
return about three-quarters of a million men to the nation’s manpower pool.”  Using the 
same words as the president, McNamara told the audience what was most important: the 
military could deliver a “vital sense of achievement and self-confidence.”  In 1967 and 
1968, the Defense Department collected mountains of data on New Standards Men.  
Reading and mathematical abilities, criminal records, employment histories were studied.  
Boot camp completion rates, military occupation assignment statistics, and performance 
evaluations were collected.  Yet, each time members of the Johnson administration spoke 
about Project 100,000, they highlighted character transformation, personal achievement, 
and self-confidence.  Thus, McNamara concluded his speech by saying, “Hundreds of 
thousands of men can be salvaged from the blight of poverty, and the Defense 
Department… is particularly well equipped to salvage them.”76
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This is not to say that Project 100,000 was without its critics, or that the virtue of 
military service was without a counter-narrative. African American Civil Rights leaders 
deplored the program. Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York called Project 
100,000 “brutal” and tantamount to “genocide.” He stated, “It’s nothing more than 
killing off human beings who are not members of the elite.”77 The Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE) issued a statement to condemn the program arguing that it would
“increase the imbalance of black Americans in the war in Vietnam.”78
However, gender complicates the politics of race.  While Civil Rights leaders 
criticized Project 100,000 in particular and the Vietnam War in general, many African
American men volunteered for combat duty in Vietnam. For example, nearly 30 percent 
of airborne units were African American (airborne personnel were volunteers) and 
reenlistment rates for blacks were three times higher than those for whites. Of course, 
inequalities in the draft system pressed more black men into the military because they 
were less likely to receive deferments.  African Americans also performed poorly on the 
AFQT, and Project 100,000 increased the number of low-scoring black men in the 
military. Patriotism explains some of these data, yet facing unemployment that was twice 
as high as that of whites, the military was an attractive option to many African
Americans.  More important to some black veterans was the psychology of feeling like a 
man.  According to one black ex-Marine, “For some goddamned reason I believed that 
the U.S.M.C. made a man out of anybody.  And I wanted to be a MAN more than 
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anything in this whole goddamned world.”79
From 1966 to 1968, 240,000 New Standards Men were inducted into the 
military.
If some black men saw the military as a 
steady job, to many military service meant taking on the burden of citizenship and being 
a man.
80
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Although McNamara promised to provide Category IV (the bottom third 
percentile group on the AFQT) men with the necessary training to qualify for jobs within
the military, thus giving men the skills to compete in the civilian economy, this trust was 
broken almost immediately.  McNamara argued that Congress had tied his hands: funding 
for major rehabilitative training was not forthcoming. Still, 96 percent of New Standards 
Men succeeded in completing basic training, compared to 98 percent service wide.  A
1968 government report on Project 100,000 boasted that 62 percent of New Standards 
Men were assigned to noncombat military occupations, which “have direct or related 
counterparts in the civilian economy.” This is a remarkable statistic in light of the fact 
that only 6 percent of New Standards Men received any serious remedial training to help
them qualify for noncombat assignments. In comparison, 70 percent of all other draftees 
were assigned to noncombat roles.  Of the nearly 40 percent assigned to combat units, the
Department of Defense reasoned that “New Standards Men perform significantly better 
in combat-type training courses” than those that required “significant reading and 
mathematical abilities.”  “Failure rates” they concluded optimistically, “have been 
80 Project 100,000 draftees dwindled from a height of 100,000 a year in 1967 and 1968 to 75,000 in 1970 and finally 
50,000 in 1971.  Nearly 400,000 New Standards Men entered the service prior to the institution of the All-Volunteer 
Force.
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dropping as a result of better assignment procedures.”81
How did the Project 100,000 men fare in this environment?  In 1986, government 
researchers sent surveys to hundreds of New Standards Men requesting their employment 
history, yearly earnings, and educational progress since Vietnam.  New Standards Men 
were compared with non-Project 100,000 veterans, as well as men who never served.  
The study found that 85 percent of New Standards Men worked full-time, slightly less 
than the 90 percent employment for nonveterans.   While all Vietnam veterans made 
significantly less money on average than those who never served, New Standards Men 
had the same average annual income as other veterans.  14 percent of New Standards 
Men attended college, or marginally less than their civilian counterparts.  
If some New Standards Men 
were more likely to be assigned to combat, the majority found in the military a potential 
job training facility.  They, and their brothers in combat units, were also enmeshed in the 
environment administration officials believed essential to building masculinity.
The researchers concluded, “Project 100,000 was less than successful 
in…providing low-aptitude and disadvantaged youth an avenue for upgrading their skills 
and potential through military service.”82 However, their research suggests that all
Vietnam veterans, not just New Standards Men, fared worse than men who did not serve.  
In the words of one New York Times columnist, “War may make men out of boys.  It does 
not seem to make them better breadwinners.”83
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However, the fact that the majority of 
those who served in Vietnam came from the working poor weakens the usefulness of 
their conclusion.  For New Standards Men in particular, it is stunning that a cohort that 
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could barely read at a sixth-grade level and whose unemployment averaged at four times 
the rest of the nation fared only slightly worse than all Vietnam veterans.  The question 
still remains, did Project 100,000 “make men out of boys?”  The survey also asked New 
Standards Men to rate their feelings about military service.   Nearly half of all New 
Standards Men, and 60 percent of African Americans, stated that military service helped 
them later in life, and only 13 percent said it hurt them in the long run.  Those who 
viewed military service positively often cited maturity, leadership, discipline, and 
motivation as the characteristics they most cherished and found reinforced in Project 
100,000.
Project 100,000 was attended by other drawbacks. New Standards Men were 
three times more likely to go Absent Without Leave (AWOL) during boot camp than 
other soldiers.  Category IV troops were two and a half times more likely to be court-
martialed, and approximately 80,000 were given Undesirable, Bad Conduct, or 
Dishonorable Discharges. However, these numbers must be weighed against the overall 
breakdown in military discipline, especially in the later years of the war. Of the roughly 
8.5 million men who served in the military during Vietnam, 563,000 received less-than-
honorable discharges. Still, the government would later cite Project 100,000 as a primary 
reason for granting clemency to Vietnam War deserters under the Ford administration.84
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CONCLUSION
Gender is a cultural construct, bred in social circumstances, that shapes self-
perception and ideals of the wider society.  From their knowledge of, and experience 
with, the military as a place for building manly character, the men of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations devised Project 100,000. They believed that the military could 
give men jobs and the necessary skills to lead successful lives.  More importantly, they 
felt that the military would instill a sense of pride, motivation, and self-worth in those 
lacking a true manhood.  These are the principles and traditions that drove Project 
100,000. In part, they recreated the World War II crucible that had so shaped their vision 
of masculinity.  War changed men, confronting them with challenges that demanded 
courage and elicited new strengths. Yet, the reality of the Vietnam War and wartime 
necessity trumped well-intentioned idealism.  Too many New Standards Men were 
handed an M-16 rather than a hammer or a welding torch. Too few received remedial 
training in reading and mathematics. The disappointment of Project 100,000 is that it 
was overtaken by the tragedy of Vietnam.  In the words of Christian Appy, “This was a 
Great Society program that was quite literally shot down on the battlefields of 
Vietnam.”85
In 1995, when Robert McNamara broke decades of silence on his involvement in 
shaping the policies of the Vietnam War, he wrote, “I want to put Vietnam in context.” 
                                                        
85 Appy, Working-Class War, 33.
 43 
We of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who participated in the decisions 
on Vietnam acted according to what we thought were the principles and traditions 
of this nation.  We made our decisions in light of those values.  Yet we were 
wrong, terribly wrong.  We owe it to future generations to explain why.86
Explaining why has encompassed interpretations based upon bureaucracy, myth, race, 
and class.  Little explored are the gendered identities of these cold warriors and the 
gendered basis of their policies.  They believed that they embodied a confident, virile, 
and self-sacrificing manhood.  They manned the deck of a ship of state that would yield 
to no other nation or ideology.  The history of Project 100,000 is a mirror of their 
gendered selves.  The world that made them men could be recreated for a new generation
that many believed was broken by racial and class prejudice and discrimination.  The 
military could make them able-bodied and whole, ready to take their places as full 
citizens of the republic.  If Vietnam was America’s test of will, for the men of Project 
100,000 it was their test of manhood.  Project 100,000 is a lens that allows a gendered 
focus on Vietnam and the Great Society.  Gender, with race and class, is crucial to our 
understanding of the politics that drove a nation in both war and peace.  
America’s experience in Vietnam fundamentally changed the relationship 
between the government and its citizens.  The traditional belief that every (male) 
American had a moral obligation to serve his country in a time of war seemed to vanish 
from the national consciousness.  The foundational ideal that propelled men to the 
pinnacle of power in post-World War II America shattered under their misuse of that 
power.  The men of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations subscribed to a culture of 
masculinity that placed a premium on self-sacrifice and service to country.  While these 
ideals faltered, the post-Vietnam volunteer military reflected some continuity with the 
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idealized past.  Although the institution of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973 made a choice 
of what was an obligation, the military remains a site for building character and salvaging 
manhood.  The Marines are still “looking for a few good men” and the Army encourages
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